REVIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Vol. 4, No. 1, Winter 2018, 1-10
Cambodia and the Asian Values Debate
Alvin Cheng-Hin Lim*
Abstract
In the run-up to the 2018 general elections, the Cambodian government
severely restricted political and human rights, including dissolving the
primary opposition party—the Cambodia National Rescue Party. Supporters
of the government have articulated defenses of these restrictions, including
a line of argument which echoes the long-standing Asian values debate. This
article will examine the purge of political and human rights in Cambodia in
2016-17, and will also assess the justifications for these restrictions.
Key Words: Asian Values, Cambodia, Democracy, Human Rights, Political
Rights.
Introduction
Following the Cambodian government’s purge of the political
opposition and the free press in 2016-17, the pro-government Khmer
Times has drawn a causal connection between the government’s
restriction of human and political rights and the country’s recent
economic development—in effect articulating a Cambodian iteration
of the long-standing Asian values debate. In his Khmer Times article,
Chan Kunthiny highlighted Cambodia’s achievements in raising its
people’s economic prospects—growth, which he noted, the World
Bank has assessed as being “pro-poor,” allowing Cambodia’s gross
national income per capita to expand by “277.9 percent between
1990 and 2015.” In addition, this pro-poor economic growth has
been accompanied with improvements in social life, as measured
according to internationally-recognized indicators like the
Millennium Development Goals and the Human Development Index.1
In view of these admirable improvements in Cambodia’s social
and economic development, Chan Kunthiny argued that the country
offers the world a “Cambodian Model” for “peace-building, nation-
building ‘from scratch’ and sustainable development.” On this view,
non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) which focus on the
Cambodian government’s human rights abuses and attacks on
* Alvin Cheng-Hin Lim (PhD, Hawaii) is a research fellow at International Public
Policy (Pvt). Ltd., Singapore. Email:alvinch@hawaii.edu.
Published (Online): May 7, 2018.
ISSN (Print): 2520-7024; ISSN (Online): 2520-7032.
2
A. C. LIM
political rights are in effect attacking the hard-won socioeconomic
progress achieved by the Cambodian people:
If investment creates jobs, then human rights NGOs are killing jobs.
When Cambodia has become an increasingly attractive destination
for foreign direct investment and tourism, which help create jobs
and income for Cambodians, by defaming Cambodia, the human
rights NGOs are killing Cambodian jobs and undermining their rights
to peace, their economic rights and rights to sustainable
development.2
Chan Kunthiny’s argument mirrors the electoral campaign rhetoric
of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, who, during the
2017
commune elections, highlighted the pivotal role of his Cambodian
People’s Party (CPP) in restoring “peace and development” to the
country following the Khmer Rouge genocide and the subsequent
civil war. Apart from its social and economic achievements, Hun Sen
also highlighted his government’s long-term goal of raising
Cambodia
“from the lower-middle income bracket into the
developed category by 2050.” Echoing Chan Kunthiny’s account of
the malign threat posed by human rights NGOs to Cambodia’s
continued economic development, Hun Sen warned of the same of
the political opposition: “The opposition has done nothing but trying
to stop foreign aid, preventing foreign investments, and telling the
EU not to import Cambodian garments. Do you call this killing or
improving our labor’s living standard?”3
The CPP, focusing on the economic dimension of development,
has in turn highlighted the economic dimension of freedom. In his
defence of China—Cambodia’s largest source of foreign direct
investment—from accusations of authoritarianism,
CPP
spokesperson Sok Eysan argued that China’s rise as a
“world
economic superpower” meant that it
“cannot” be seen as
authoritarian. China’s appeal to Cambodia stems from not just its
economic rise, but also its one-party political system.4
Indeed,
Chinese President Xi Jinping has promoted to other countries China’s
“new type of political party system.” Chinese analyst Wang Xiaohong
has described the stability of the Chinese model as an advantage over
Western democracies which suffer from “endless power transitions
and social chaos.”5 Sok Eysan likewise observed that the conflict in
the United States between President Donald Trump and the political
opposition has led to unnecessary political gridlock: “Because of
what? It is because of the opposition party waiting to oppose, and it
is an obstacle of his national process.”6
Repression in Cambodia in 2016-17
In hindsight, the highly-publicized assassination of the prominent
human rights advocate Kem Ley in July 2016 may be seen as marking
REVIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS
3
the beginning of the latest phase of the Cambodian government’s
repression of political and human rights. Shortly before his murder,
Kem Ley had discussed with the local media the anticorruption NGO
Global Witness’ recent report which “revealed the extensive business
interests of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen’s family.”7 Due to the
widespread public anger over his murder, Kem Ley’s funeral
procession attracted thousands of participants. While the pro-
government media dutifully restricted their coverage of the massive
funeral procession, the independent media did not. The
government’s crackdown on the independent media subsequently
followed.8
Kem Ley’s murder was not the only such act of political violence
during this period. In March 2018, police and military personnel
opened fire on a group of protestors in Kratie province, killing,
according to eyewitness accounts, around
6-8
people. The
protestors, who numbered over
400, had been demonstrating
against the forced eviction of 300 villagers by a rubber plantation.
Following the unrest, several villagers were detained, and one of
them, who had earlier claimed to be an eyewitness to the killings,
recanted her statement. Rhona Smith, the United Nations’ Human
Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur on Cambodia, has called for a
“prompt investigation” into the incident, as has Brad Adams, the Asia
director of Human Rights Watch.9
This period also witnessed a severe restriction of press freedom
in Cambodia. Not only has there been “a sharp increase in the
number of journalists reporting being verbally or physically attacked
since 2015,” government intervention led to the closures of the
newspaper The Cambodia Daily, and the radio stations Voice of
America Cambodia, Voice of Democracy, and Radio Free Asia Khmer,
which were “four outlets deemed to be ranked in the country’s top
six in terms of independence and unbiased reporting.” In addition,
“two reporters, who had in the past worked for Radio Free Asia,
were charged with ‘espionage’ and imprisoned, while two former
Cambodia Daily reporters also were charged with ‘incitement.’” In
contrast to the travails of the independent media, pro-government
media outlets grew in strength.10
Freedom of expression in Cambodia was further restricted in
February 2018 when the National Assembly and the Senate passed a
lèse-majesté law which punishes insults against the Cambodian king
with “one to five years in prison and a fine of 2 million riel to 10
million riel
(about
$500 to $2,500).” CPP Senator Chum Vong
explained that it was in Cambodia’s national interest to restrict
freedom of expression: “In the past, we had a problem because we
were thinking too much about freedom, which allowed [people] to
4
A. C. LIM
say and raise whatever they wanted. It affected other people’s rights
and the national interest, so it … became anarchy.” Human rights
advocates have observed that Cambodia’s lèse-majesté law mirrors
similar laws in Thailand which “have been used … to curb free
speech and crack down on political dissidents and journalists.”11 In
March 2018, Cambodia’s lèse-majesté law was invoked against an
activist monk for mentioning the king in a radio interview in which
he criticized Prime Minister Hun Sen for allowing ethnic Vietnamese
residents to live on Cambodia’s Tonlé Sap lake.12
Apart from cracking down on the independent media, the CPP-
led government has also attacked the opposition Cambodian
National Rescue Party (CNRP). While the CNRP had failed to win the
2013 general elections, it won enough seats to deprive the CPP of its
two-thirds majority in the National Assembly.13 The government
responded with a “campaign of intimidation and repression against
the political opposition and civil society,”14
and
“at least
35
opposition and civil society leaders” have been detained since July
2015, “many of whom have been prosecuted and convicted in
summary trials that failed to meet international standards.”15 The
crackdown on the CNRP climaxed with the arrest in September 2017
of CNRP leader Kem Sokha on charges of “treason and espionage,”16
and the Cambodian Supreme Court’s dissolution the following month
of the CNRP, accompanied with the banning of “118 of its senior
officials from any political activity in the Kingdom for five years.”17
With only a scattering of minor opposition parties left, the CPP’s
success in the 2018 general elections is all but guaranteed.
Cambodia and the Asian Values Debate
How do the arguments of Chan Kunthiny and the CPP fit into the
Asian values debate? As Randall Peerenboom reminds us, the debate
has evolved over a number of phases.18 The Asian values position
was originally articulated by the long-time former Prime Ministers of
Singapore and Malaysia, Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir Mohammed,
who articulated their understanding of “universal human rights as an
alien imposition from the West, reflecting specific Western values,”
and who “argued for an approach based on ‘Asian values’ instead.” As
Lee Kuan Yew stated, “Asia has never valued the individual over
society. The society has always been more important than the
individual.”19 Likewise, Mahathir Mohammed argued that “while the
individuals must have their rights, these must not extend to the point
where they deprive the rights of the majority.” Mahathir also claimed
that “many Western societies […] are morally decadent,” and he
advised then-President Abdurrahman Wahid of Indonesia to “not
follow this ‘Western’ model to run his government.”20
REVIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS
5
The Asian values position was subsequently formalized in the
1993 Bangkok Declaration,21 in which Asian governments—meeting
as a region before the United Nations’ 1993 World Conference on
Human Rights in Vienna—stated that, while they remained
committed to “the principles contained in the Charter of the United
Nations and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights as well as
the full realization of all human rights throughout the world,” it had
to be recognized that human rights had to be “considered in the
context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-
setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious
backgrounds.” In practical terms, these Asian governments
demanded “respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity
as well as non-interference in the internal affairs of States, and the
non-use of human rights as an instrument of political pressure,” and
they emphasized that “economic and social progress facilitates the
growing trend towards democracy and the promotion and
protection of human rights.”22
The Asian values debate was subsequently shaped by the 1997
Asian Financial Crisis, with the event initially leading
“many
opponents of Asian values” to blame “the crisis on Asian values” and
thereby to declare victory for the position of universal human rights.
Following the end of the crisis and the recovery of Asian economies,
“advocates of Asian values … questioned to what extent Asian values
were a cause of the crisis,” and argued that Asian values had “played
an important role in the recovery.” For instance, some observed that
“many Asian countries that have democratized continue to suffer
major socioeconomic problems and struggle to maintain social order
and stability,” while states with a “strong (soft-authoritarian) ruling
regime,” such as China and Singapore, “did not suffer from the crisis
as much as other economies in Asia.”23
Cambodia may be positioned as a case study in this latter phase
of the Asian values debate, as not only was it impacted by the 1997
Asian Financial Crisis,24 it was also impacted that same year by Hun
Sen’s coup d’état against Prince Norodom Ranariddh,25 a violent
event which included the extrajudicial killings of members of the
royalist Funcinpec party.26 Despite the economic and political shocks
of 1997, Hun Sen and his CPP-led government guided Cambodia to a
swift recovery, and in the following decade from
1998-2007,
Cambodia’s growth was the sixth highest “across all countries in the
world.” Indeed, in his 2010 report, World Bank economist Stéphane
Guimbert predicted that “at the rate of growth of the past decade (7
percent per capita per annum), it will take only another ten years for
Cambodia to double its income per capita, reaching middle-income
6
A. C. LIM
status.”27 Cambodia achieved this just five years later in 2015, when
its GDP per capita rose to 1,225 USD, “elevating Cambodia from the
ranks of the world’s low-income to that of the world’s lower middle-
income countries.”28
The Cambodian iteration of the Asian values debate is not only in
the economic dimension. A cultural dimension may also be found in
Cambodia’s history of violence which long predates the Khmer
Rouge genocide. As David Chandler observes, “coercion, violence and
megalomania” have
“always been features of Cambodian
governance.”29 The impact of this history of violence can be found in
the chbap, poems dating from the precolonial era which prescribe
traditional norms of behavior. One such chbap admonishes the
ordinary people to beware their ruling elite—a warning which
remains relevant today:
Officials, civil and military,
Are comparable to tigers
Or spotted snakes.
Whenever the people come to them
Seeking assistance
They change immediately into demons
Without compassion.30
In view of the violence and injustice the ordinary people suffer from
the elite, the chbap guide their listeners to “confront, evade, or better
the harsh conditions of everyday life” by recommending “village-
centered common sense,” such as obeying “masters outside the
family […] honoring one’s betters, looking fondly at the past, and
praising the acuity of old people.”31 Such cultural norms—obedience
to authority, respect for hierarchy, and reverence for tradition—are
the constituents of a “thick” morality. As Joseph Chan explains, moral
life is
“thickly constituted” in that moral principles, including the
principles of human rights, are “embedded and elaborated in a
society with a particular set of circumstances (its culture, economy,
politics, etc.).” However, Chan also notes that thick morality in itself
does not exclude universal human rights.32 The chbap, after all, offer
survival strategies in a world that is already understood to be violent
and unjust. A society that wants a fresh start from this cycle of
violence and injustice—as suggested by the popularity of the CNRP
among younger Cambodian voters—would embrace the principles of
human rights as norms which would prevent the government and
the elite from perpetuating their historical norms of abusing and
predating on the ordinary people.33
The economic argument too does not support the Cambodian
government’s restrictions on political and human rights. Despite the
achievement of pro-poor growth, Cambodia’s economic development
REVIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS
7
has substantially increased economic inequality. This inequality has
manifested itself in the form of objects of consumption which are
desired but unattainable by the poor. The modern shopping malls
which have recently emerged across Phnom Penh and Siem Reap are
not the only emporia where such objects of desire may be found. On
the streets, envy and resentment are directed at the high-priced
luxury vehicles driven by the elite. Even more galling to the poor are
the new satellite cities which are being constructed around Phnom
Penh—at the cost of the displacement of tens of thousands of poor
from their lands—which offer luxurious housing and amenities for
the wealthy.34
The government is even constructing “hotel-like”
prison accommodations for wealthy inmates, which are “a far cry
from typical Cambodian prison cells, where scores often share a
single latrine and ailments like nutritional deficiencies, abnormal
physical weakness, diarrhea and scabies are common.”35
The
number of Cambodians who desire a change in their country’s
situation is substantial. In the 2017 commune elections, the CNRP
won three million votes—over 43 percent of the total votes.36 These
three million voters have now lost their opportunity to vote for the
CNRP in the 2018 general elections, and many CNRP supporters have
indicated that they will simply boycott the elections.37
The
dissatisfaction expressed by such a large segment of the population
belies the claim of the ruling elite that the country’s economic
development justifies the restriction of political and human rights,
and strengthens the suspicion that the economic argument is little
more than a tactic to legitimate the CPP’s continued authoritarian
rule.38
Notes
1.
Chan Kunthiny, “UN Country Team.”
2.
Ibid.
3.
Promchertchoo, “Vote for peace.”
4.
Ben and Baliga, “CPP spokesman.”
5.
Huang, “Xi Jinping.”
6.
Ben and Baliga, “CPP spokesman.”
7.
Hostile Takeover.
8.
Lim, “Political Subjectivity,” 37.
9.
Eckert, “UN Seeks Details.”
10. Ouch Sony, “Cambodia media.”
11. Ben and Nachemson, “As UN Raises Concerns.”
12. Niem Chheng and Kijewski, “Lèse majesté law.”
13. Lim, “Cambodia Rising,” 68.
14. Lim, “Human Rights in Cambodia,” 17-18.
15. Human Rights Watch, Cambodia: Events of 2017.
16.
“Cambodia's Opposition Leader.”
17. Ben, Dara, and Baliga, “‘Death of democracy.’”
8
A. C. LIM
18. Peerenboom, “Beyond Universalism,” 2.
19. Tew, Beyond “Asian Values,” 5-6.
20. Hoon, “Revisiting the Asian Values,” 155-157.
21. Peerenboom, “Beyond Universalism,” 2.
22. Final Declaration.
23. Peerenboom, “Beyond Universalism,” 3-4.
24. Okonjo-Iweala, Kwakwa, Beckwith, and Ahmed,
“Impact of Asia's
Financial Crisis.”
25. Lim, “Human Rights,” 16.
26. Ear, Aid Dependence, 25.
27. Guimbert, “Cambodia 1998-2008,” 2.
28. Lim, “Human Rights,” 17.
29. Chandler, “Coming to Cambodia,”25-26.
30. Chandler, “Normative Poems,” 274.
31. Chandler,
“Normative Poems,”
277. See also Chandler, Facing the
Cambodian Past, 78.
32. Chan, “Thick and Thin,” 62-64.
33. Lim, “Cambodia Rising,” 68.
34. Robertson, “The Pristine Exclusivity.”
35. Soth Koemsoeun, “Nicer Jails.”
36. Hoekstra, “Is Cambodia an Autocratic State now?”
37. Ouch Sony, “More than 1 million Cambodians.”
38. Frick, “Universal Claim,” 23.
References
Ben Sokhean and Ananth Baliga. “CPP spokesman touts one-party rule,
points to China’s example.” Phnom Penh Post, February
27,
2018.
Accessed March
12,
politics/cpp-spokesman-touts-one-party-rule-points-chinas-example.
Ben Sokhean, Mech Dara, and Ananth Baliga. “‘Death of democracy’: CNRP
dissolved by Supreme Court ruling.” Phnom Penh Post, November 17,
post-depth-politics/death-democracy-cnrp-dissolved-supreme-court-
ruling.
Ben Sokhean and Andrew Nachemson.
“As UN raises concerns over
amendments, government says new lèse majesté law will apply to
media.” Phnom Penh Post, February 22, 2018. Accessed March 12, 2018.
amendments-government-says-new-lese-majeste-law-will-apply-
media.
“Cambodia's opposition leader charged with treason.” AFP, September 6,
2017. Accessed March
12,
asia/cambodias-opposition-leader-charged-with-treason.
Chan, Joseph. “Thick and Thin Accounts of Human Rights.” In Human Rights
and Asian Values: Contesting National Identities and Cultural
Representations in Asia, edited by Michael Jacobsen and Ole Bruun, 59-
74. Surrey: Curzon Press, 2000.
Chan Kunthiny. “UN Country Team should promote ‘Cambodian Model’ and
fight ‘political-human-rights-porn.’” Khmer Times, February 19, 2018.
Accessed March
12,
REVIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS
9
country-team-promote-cambodian-model-fight-political-human-rights-
porn/.
Chandler, David. “Coming to Cambodia.” In At the Edge of the Forest: Essays
on Cambodia, History and Narrative in Honor of David Chandler, edited
by Anne Ruth Hansen and Judy Ledgerwood, 21-27. Ithaca: Southeast
Asia Program Publications, 2008.
Chandler, David. Facing the Cambodian Past: Selected Essays 1971-1994.
Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1996.
Chandler, David. “Normative Poems (Chbap) and Pre-Colonial Cambodian
Society.” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies
15
(1984):
271-279.
doi:10.1017/S0022463400012510.
Ear Sophal. Aid Dependence in Cambodia: How Foreign Assistance
Undermines Democracy. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013.
Eckert, Paul. “UN Seeks Details on Land Shooting as Cambodia Silences
Witness.” RFA, March
9,
2018. Accessed March
12,
2018.
03092018154857.html.
Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on
Human Rights. March 29-April 2, 1993. Accessed March 13, 2018.
al-declaration-of-the-regional-meeting-for-asia-of-the-world-
conference-on-human-rights.html.
Frick, Marie-Luisa. “Universal Claim and Postcolonial Realities: The Deep
Unease over Western-Centered Human Rights Standards in the Global
South.” In Human Rights and the Third World: Issues and Discourses,
edited by Subrata Sankar Bagchi and Arnab Das, 17-30. Lanham:
Lexington Books.
Guimbert, Stéphane. “Cambodia 1998-2008: An Episode of Rapid Growth,”
Policy Research Working Paper
5271. The World Bank,
2010.
doi:10.1596/1813-9450-5271.
Hoekstra, Ate.
“Is Cambodia an autocratic state now?” Deutsche Welle,
cambodia-an-autocratic-state-now/a-41469690.
Hoon, Chang Yau. “Revisiting the Asian values argument used by Asian
political leaders and its validity.” The Indonesian Quarterly 32 (2004):
154-174.
Hostile Takeover: How Cambodia’s ruling family are pulling the strings on the
economy and amassing vast personal fortunes with extreme consequences
for the population. London: Global Witness, July 2016. Accessed March
Huang, Zheping. “Xi Jinping says China’s authoritarian system can be a
model for the world.” Quartz, March 9, 2018. Accessed March 12, 2018.
qz.com/1225347/xi-jinping-says-chinas-one-party-authoritarian-
system-can-be-a-model-for-the-world/.
Human Rights Watch. Cambodia: Events of 2017, 2017. Accessed March 12,
Lim, Alvin Cheng-Hin.
“Cambodia Rising: Neoliberal Violence and
Development.” JATI: Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 18 (2013): 61-
72.
10
A. C. LIM
Lim, Alvin Cheng-Hin. “Human Rights in Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge.”
Review of Human Rights 1 (2015): 12-23.
Lim, Alvin Cheng-Hin. “Political Subjectivity in Cambodia.” The Newsletter 78
(2017): 37.
Niem Chheng and Kijewski, Leonie. “Lèse majesté law invoked against
prominent monk.” Phnom Penh Post, March 1, 2018. Accessed March 12,
against-prominent-monk.
Okonjo-Iweala, Ngozi, Victoria Kwakwa, Andrea Beckwith, and Zafar Ahmed.
“Impact of Asia’s Financial Crisis on Cambodia and the Lao PDR.”
Finance & Development
36
fandd/1999/09/okonjo.htm.
Ouch Sony. “Cambodia media freedom in decline, journalists harassed:
Report.” Channel NewsAsia, February 22, 2018. Accessed March 12,
freedom-in-decline-journalists-harassed-report-9980396.
Ouch Sony. “More than 1 million Cambodians won’t be able to vote in 2018
election.” Channel NewsAsia, November 11, 2017. Accessed March 15,
2018.
million-cambodians-won-t-be-able-to-vote-in-2018-9397038.
Peerenboom, Randall. “Beyond Universalism and Relativism: The Evolving
Debates about ‘Values in Asia.’” Indiana International & Comparative
Law Review 14 (2003): 1-85.
Promchertchoo, Pichayada. “Vote for peace and development: Hun Sen tells
Cambodians ahead of commune election.” Channel NewsAsia, June 3,
asiapacific/vote-peace-development-in-cambodia-commune-election-
hun-sen-8909174.
Robertson, Holly. “The Pristine Exclusivity of Cambodia’s ‘Imported Cities.’”
Next City, February
12,
2018. Accessed March
15,
2018.
nextcity.org/features/view/the-pristine-exclusivity-of-cambodias-
imported-cities.
Soth Koemsoeun.
“Nicer jails for wealthy inmates mulled as fix to
Cambodia’s prison overcrowding.” Phnom Penh Post, February
21,
nicer-jails-wealthy-inmates-mulled-fix-cambodias-prison-
overcrowding.
Tew, Yvonne. Beyond “Asian Values”: Rethinking Rights. CGHR Working
Paper
5. Centre of Governance and Human Rights, University of
Cambridge, 2012.
