REVIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Vol. 4, No. 1, Winter 2018, 50-63.

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.35994/rhr.v4i1.89

 

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The death of Jamal Kashoggi: Issues of Human Rights Violations and International Law

Jumoke Adegbonmire*

::::::Desktop:orcid image.pnghttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-6963-4672

 

Abstract

State responsibility is a cardinal principle of international law. The doctrine of State sovereignty under international law accords StatesÕ legal personality and requires that they fulfill international obligations. International law imposes obligations on States to perform their duties in ensuring that a breach of international law does not go unpunished. Consequences for such actions means that States need to adhere to procedural and substantive law in addition to offering reparation for the violation of an international obligation. In the past, violation of an international obligation was only attributed to States as they were considered to be the only entity that could possess rights and duties within the international sphere. Therefore States were considered to be the only ones that could be criminally liable for acts that could be attributed to them. But the development in human rights law and the advent of rules governing personal criminal responsibility has extended the scope of international obligations under international law to include States and individuals as being liable for international crimes. The international law disallows immunity from prosecution in foreign domestic courts for the most serious crimes: Re-Pinochet case. This means State responsibility and individual responsibility for wrongful acts are not mutually exclusive.   

Key words: customary international law, extradition, human rights, Khashoggi, torture.

                                                     

Introduction                    

It has been six months since the death of Jamal Kashoggi inside the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul, Turkey. On October 2, 2018 Jamal Kashoggi a journalist, Saudi dissident and a Washington post columnist was killed inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey. Kashoggi was at the Saudi consulate to obtain documents to marry his Turkish fiancŽe, Hatice Cengiz. Turkish investigations reported the incident as a case of torture and premeditated murder perpetrated by Saudi intelligence officials. The Sky News headline for 15th of November 2018 reads thus, ÔJamal Kashoggi murder: Five suspects may face death penaltyÕ. Reports show that, Saudi ArabiaÕs public prosecutor is seeking the award of death penalty for five people charged with the murder of Jamal Kashoggi.

     Saudi Arabia Government in a coy manner refused to accept direct responsibility for the death of the journalist and for the crimes committed. On the contrary, it blames the officials of its State intelligence unit for carrying out the alleged operations and crimes without the necessary approval from Mohammed Bin Salman Al Saud, the Deputy Prime Minister and Crown Prince to the throne of Saudi Arabia. But under human rights laws and international criminal law, individuals may be held criminally responsible for international crimes (Article 7(1) ICTY and Article 6(1) ICTR)[i] and human rights violations. Saudi Arabia claims that the government did not approve the operation but this is open to arguments and other interpretations. However, the article will focus on Ôindividual liabilityÕ of officials of Saudi intelligence for international crimes and human rights violations in relation to legal instruments which requires a duty on the part of the State to ensure that those liable for such crimes are punished.

Fundamental nature of International Human Rights Laws:

Saudi Arabia can be expected to respect the provisions of international instruments, which have been recognized as norms of customary international law even though it is not a party to such an instrument. First, by virtue of being a member of the United Nations (UN), is charged with the responsibility to uphold universal human rights laws (preamble to the UN Charter) and secondly, due to the recognition that some of the provisions of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)[ii] and Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)[iii] have become recognized as norms of customary international law. The ICCPR is a legally binding treaty though Saudi Arabia is not a party to the instrument, which means it is not bound by the instrument. But Saudi Arabia is obliged to respect some of its provisions due to the universally binding character of some of the rights included in the Covenant. For example, the right to life (Article 6), prohibition of torture (Article 7) and prohibition from slavery (Article 8) are all considered as having reached the status of Customary International Law (CIL). Meaning these rights has Ôa universally binding character.Õ The important feature of CIL is believed to be its ability to bind States which have not consented to its rules. In North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated that a rule that:

Ôpassed into the general corpus of international law accepted as such by opinio juris so as to have become binding even for countries which have never, and do not, become parties to the ConventionÉState practice, including that of States whose interests are specifically affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniformÉas to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.Õ[iv]

Article 38 outlines the source of international law thereby creating a method by which international law becomes binding on States. In Article 38 (1) (b) of the Statute of ICJ gives the definition of international custom Ôas evidence of a general practice accepted as lawÕ. The criterion adopted in North Sea Continental Shelf Cases is that for an act to constitute international custom:

Ônot only must the facts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis. The State concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency, or even habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough.Õ[v]

L.D.M Nelson seems to be of the opinion that, it is, necessary to consider the impact created by acts performed by States within the societal structure. He opined that:

Ônevertheless, it is submitted that to discover whether a uniform practice among States constitutes a custom in international law what ought to be examined is not the psychological motivation of the States concerned but the social ends of their external acts. Thus the difference between acts in the field of ceremonial and protocol and, for instance, acts delimiting the lateral continental shelf boundaries would lie not on whether States in performing these acts were motivated by a sense of legal obligation or not but on social importance of the particular practice to the international community.Õ[vi]

According to J. Charney suggested that beyond the scope of state practice and opinio juris, multilateral forums also aid in the crystallization of the rules of international law:

ÔRather than state practice and opinio juris, multilateral forums often play a central role in the creation and shaping of contemporary international law. Those forums include the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, regional organizations, and standing and ad hoc multilateral diplomatic conferences, as well as international organizations devoted to specialized subjects. Today major developments in international law often get their start or substantial support from proposals, reports, resolutions, treaties or protocols debated on such forums. At other times, the potential new law is developed through the medium of international relations or the practices of specialized international institutions and at later stages is addressed in international forums. That process draws attention to the rule and helps to crystallize it.Õ[vii] 

For States which do not consent to the rules of customary international law, their actions does not nullify such rules according to the joint opinion of five judges in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case that, ÔState practice must be common, consistent and concordantÕ.[viii] If State practice is common, consistent and concordant as regards a rule of CIL then the violation of such a rule will be considered as a breach of customary law.

     While an international treaty such as the ICCPR is binding only on parties who have expressed their consent to be bound by its provisions, a rule of CIL does not need this type of consent and therefore binds all states without distinction. In the international field there is, at present, no statutory international law or code.[ix] In other words, international law, so far, is only of a customary character.

     This notion was further expressed by J. Charney in ÔThe Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International LawÕ that:

ÔWhen the question of consent is directly addressed, most writers argue that States do not have the free will to decide whether or not to be bound by rules of international law. The obligation to conform to rules of international law is not derived from the voluntary decision of a State to accept or reject the binding force of a rule of law. Rather, it is the societal context which motivates States to have an international law and obligates them to conform to its norms.Õ[x]

In addition, the manner in which States adhere to customary law is propagated by the way StatesÕ conduct international affairs. Looking at the way the international community encourages continuity as regards the protection of human rights and humanitarian law principles even in relation to succession of States, there is no doubt that the protection of human rights law does not involve the loss of autonomy or sovereignty for a State. This is expressed in the Separate Opinion by Judge Weeramantry in the Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (Indication of Provisional Measures) on whether each new State that separated from Yugoslavia could assume treaty-based responsibilities in relation to the Genocide Convention:

ÔHuman rights and humanitarian treaties involve no loss of sovereignty or autonomy of the new State, but are merely in line with general principles of protection that flow from the inherent dignity of every human being which is the very foundation of the United Nations Charter. It is sufficient for the purposes of this Opinion to note a variety of reasons why it has been contended that human rights and humanitarian treaties in general attract the principle of automatic succession. These reasons apply with special force to treaties such as the Genocide Convention or the Convention against Torture, leaving no room for doubt regarding automatic succession to such treaties.Õ[xi]  

     By virtue of its membership in the UN, it is very pertinent to uphold such rights as stated in Article 9 of the UDHR and ICCPR, which does not allow anyone to be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. Also Article 10 of UDHR and Article 14 of the ICCPR entitles individuals to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal as against any criminal charges brought an individual. Also, Article 6: right to life and Article 7: freedom from torture is of a fundamental nature as it permits no derogation due to recognition of the peremptory nature of these rights. Some of the provisions of these instruments are recognized as norms of customary international law.

Aspects of International Law in Jamal KashoggiÕs case:

The act of torture and murder by the officials of Saudi intelligence violates KashoggiÕs basic right to life as stated in articles 6 & 7 of ICCPR. The prohibition of torture is contained in the ÔConvention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or PunishmentÕ.[xii] Torture is defined in article 1(1) of the Convention and article 5(2) allows for State parties to undertake universal jurisdiction in respect of the act of torture. Both Saudi Arabia and Turkey are States Parties to the Torture Convention[xiii] and contracting parties to the torture Convention are under duties inter alia to take measures to prevent such activities in territories under their jurisdiction (article2); not to return a person to a country where he may be subjected to torture (article 3).

     In line with article 4 States are required to prosecute offenders alleged to have committed the crime of torture. The key elements for the assertion of universal jurisdiction in relation to an international crime such as the act of Torture are[xiv], the definition of the crime of torture under the Convention Against Torture; it must be established that the State parties have obligations to prevent the act under its jurisdiction and to treat it as a punishable offence under its criminal law; the state needs to establish jurisdiction over this international crime, in this case on the basis of territoriality and nationality (Article 5)[xv]; contracting States must ensure that the crime of torture is included in its domestic laws as an extraditable offence[xvi] and in the event that an extradition treaty does not exist between the contracting parties, the requesting party can use the provisions of the convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of such offences (article 8(2));[xvii] the convention also stipulates that contracting parties have the obligation to extradite or prosecute, aut dedare aut judicare (Article 7).[xviii] In addition, article 14 makes a provision for remedies for persons who suffer the acts of torture.

     Other international legal instruments such as humanitarian law and human rights treaties also prohibit the act of torture. The prohibition of torture derives from a number of instruments: 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (article 10);[xix] 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 5);[xx] 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (article 15);[xxi] 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (article 37(a));[xxii] African Charter on Human and PeoplesÕ Rights (article 5);[xxiii] European Convention on Human Rights (article 3);[xxiv] 1989 European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;[xxv] Inter-American Convention on Human Rights (article 5(2));[xxvi] 1987 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture;[xxvii] the Arab Charter on Human Rights (article 8).[xxviii] For international humanitarian law, the 1949 Four Geneva Conventions:[xxix] common article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions, article 12 for the First and Second Geneva Conventions, article 17 and 87 of the Third Geneva Convention, article 32 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Also for the Additional Protocol I, articles 75 (2) (a) & (e), 85[xxx] and Additional Protocol II, article 4 (2) (a) & (h).[xxxi] Other articles include:  articles 50 & 51 (Convention I & II), 130 (Convention III), 147 (Convention IV) and Additional Protocol I, article 85.

     An overwhelming majority of States consider the act of torture as violating the rule of jus cogens. Rules of jus cogens are substantive rules recognised to be of a higher status from which no derogation is permitted.[xxxii] It is a peremptory norm as well as a rule of international law. Article 41 (2) of the ILCÕs Articles on State Responsibility (2001) provides that Ôno State shall recognise as lawful a situation created by a  serious breach by a State of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law.Õ[xxxiii] It has also been suggested that State conduct violating a rule of jus cogens may not attract a claim of State immunity. The violation of this rule allows for perpetrators to be tried in a domestic court. As stated in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention any domestic law which conflicts with this rule of jus cogens is considered void.[xxxiv] Under customary international law, the international community have come to recognise the prohibition of torture as acquiring the status of jus cogens stemming from evolving State practice and decisions of judicial bodies Furundžija case.[xxxv] In this case, the State has an obligation Ôtowards the international community as a wholeÕ that is, erga omnes obligations Barcelona Traction case.[xxxvi] Meaning States have a legal interest in protecting the violations of these obligations. The prohibition of torture as a peremptory norm of international law permits no derogation and this is applicable to all States.

     Also, prosecutorial process can be carried out by another State under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction based on the nature of one the crimes committed by the officials. That is, the act of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment meted out on the victim. The principal ground for a criminal proceeding by the Turkish government is territoriality. This warrants an assertion of universal jurisdiction by Turkey on the bases of territoriality[xxxvii], also the act violates a rule of jus cogens and as such create erga omnes obligation for Turkey to prosecute the breach of an international obligation. Turkey will be fulfilling its international obligation in the event that Saudi Arabia declines in prosecuting its State officials for this violation of fundamental human rights of jus cogens nature.

The Pinochet case

On the issue of diplomatic immunities for the Saudi intelligence officials, consideration should be given to the decisions in the Pinochet cases,[xxxviii] which challenged the immunity of foreign heads of State from criminal proceedings before foreign courts in the context of the implementation of torture. The judicial decisions in this case centred on the issue of conferring immunity ratione materiae on Heads of State as regards criminal prosecutions for international crimes.[xxxix] The basis for PinochetÕs extradition was the 1972 European Convention on Extradition.[xl] The Crown Prosecution on behalf of the Kingdom of Spain applied for General PinochetÕs extradition to Spain. A second arrest warrant was issued charging Pinochet with torture and conspiracy to torture. The House of Lords decided Augusto Pinochet did not enjoy immunity ratione materiae from extradition proceedings on the charges of torture and conspiracy to torture.[xli]

     Owing to the prohibition of torture as stated in article 5(2) and 7 of the Torture Convention, this doctrine allows other States to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over offenders who are guilty in committing a breach of a rule of jus cogens which offends the international community as a whole. In addition, Saudi government intelligence personnel committed gross violations of human rights, which apart from torture included abduction, murder and enforced disappearance.[xlii]

     The international community should not condone any form of extrajudicial activities against any individual including a serious breach of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law.    

Conclusion

One of the existing reasons for the consensual nature of international law is that it preserves the international legal system. The observance of international law prevents the breach of international obligations. International law relies on the formulation of international agreements to which the signatories agree to adhere to. The principle of good faith is one of the basic principles governing the performance of legal obligations by signatories to international agreements. The principle of pact sunt servanda in treaty law stipulates that States consent to be bound in good faith by the obligation created in the treaty.

     One of the very good ways by which the consensual nature of international law can be preserved is by ensuring the observance of international agreements such as treaty laws. Adhering to the rules of treaty laws even in criminal prosecutions of foreign citizens before the municipal courts of other countries is very important to the international community. Criminal prosecutions before the municipal courts of other countries for the most serious crimes committed by highranking officers should not be disallowed on the basis of immunity ratione materiae. The nature of the crime should serve as the basis for assertion of jurisdiction over these State officials. The positive side to this will be that, States will respect their international obligations and this will in turn preserve the international legal system.

     The need for a legal regulatory framework ensures stability and allows recourse to these rules when conflicts arise between States. The disregard for these rules is often not encouraged within the international community because it alters the behavioural patterns of States who have consented to adhering to a rule of international law. This is why States are usually encouraged to act reasonably in order to avoid confrontations. This equals to protecting the elements of tolerance, reciprocity and the rewards that come with it.

 

Notes

 



*Jumoke Adegbonmire is the principal consultant at WillFran Consulting. Email: willfranconsulting@gmail.com.

Published Online: August 22, 2019.                                    

ISSN (Print): 2520-7024; ISSN (Online): 2520-7032.

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[i] UN Security Council, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (as amended on 17 May 2002), 25 May 1993 and UN Security Council, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Rwanda (as last amended on 13 October 2006), 8 November 1994.

[ii] United Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171.

[iii] United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, United Nations, 217 A (III).

[iv] North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands), I.C.J. Reports 1969, paras. 71 & 74.

[v] ibid. para. 77.

[vi] L.D.M. Nelson, ÔThe North Sea Continental Shelf Cases and Law-Making ConventionsÕ, The Modern Law Review, vol. 35, No. 1, Jan. 1972, pp. 55-56.

[vii] J. Charney, ÔUniversal International LawÕ, 87 AJIL 529 (1993), PP. 543-545.

[viii] Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, I.C.J. Rep 1973 3.

[ix] H.C. Gutteridge, ÔThe Meaning and Scope of Article 38 (1) ( c ) of the Statute of International Court of JusticeÕ, Transactions of the Grotius Society, vol. 38, (1952), p.133, 125-134, JSTOR.

[x] J. Charney, ÔThe Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International Law, 56 BYBIL, (1985) 1.

[xi] Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (Indication of Provisional Measures), ICJ Rep 1993, p. 645.

[xii] 10 December 1984, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, p. 85.

[xiii] 12 Saudi Arabia gave its accession to the Convention in September 1997 and Turkey ratified the Convention in August 1988.

[xiv] For discussion on ÔThe Universality PrincipleÕ, see Alina Kaczorowska, Public International Law (4th Edn Routledge Taylor and Francis Group 2010), Chapter 8, 8.6 to 8.6.3.6, pp. 324 to 337, pp. 328-9; Malcolm Shaw, International Law (6th Edn CUP 2008), p. 668; Jan Klabbers, International Law (CUP 2016) p. 94.

[xv] A contracting State exercises its jurisdiction on the basis of the terms of the treaty rather than on any generally principle of customary international law. See ibid. Alina Kaczorowska, pp. 328-9. Since Turkey and Saudi Arabia are all parties to the Convention, they are bound under treaty by its provisions.

[xvi] See also Pinochet case, [1999] UKHL 17

[xvii] The exercise by a State of universal jurisdiction based on customary international law raises many controversies. See n15 Alina Kaczorowska, p. 349.

[xviii] The ICJ opined that the choice between extradition or submission for prosecution, pursuant to the Convention, does not mean that the two alternatives are to be given the same weight. Extradition is an option offered to the State by the Convention, whereas prosecution is an international obligation under the Convention, the violation of which is a wrongful act engaging the responsibility of the State. See Questions Concerning the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), Judgment (July 20, 2012) para. 95.    

[xix] UN General Assembly, 18 December 1990, A/RES/45/158.

[xx] See n3

[xxi] UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: resolution/adopted by General Assembly, 24 January 2007, A/RES/61/106.

[xxii] UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p.3.

[xxiii] Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Charter on Human and PeoplesÕ Rights (ÒBanjul CharterÓ), 27 June 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).

[xxiv] Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950 ETS 5.

[xxv] European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ETS No. 126.

[xxvi] Organization of American States (OAS), American Convention on Human Rights, ÒPact of San JoseÓ, Costa Rica, 22 November 1969.

[xxvii] Organization of American States (OAS), Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, 9 December 1985, OAS Treaty Series, No. 67.

[xxviii] League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, 15 September 1994.

[xxix] Geneva Convention for Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 75 UNTS 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, 75 UNTS 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 UNTS 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, 75 UNTS 287, 12 August 1949.

[xxx] Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3. 

[xxxi] Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non- International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 609. 

[xxxii] See United Nations, Article 53 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331.

[xxxiii] Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, November 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1.

[xxxiv] See United Nations, Article 53 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331

[xxxv] Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija (Trial Judgment), IT-95-17/1-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 10 December 1998; 38 ILM (1999) 317, at 349-350 (para. 153-156), [2000] 1 AC 147, 198.

[xxxvi] Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Senegal); Second Phase, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 5 February 1970, I.C.J. Rep 4, at 33-34.

[xxxvii] Thus, all crimes committed (or alleged to have been committed) within the territorial jurisdiction of a State may come before the municipal courts and the accused if convicted may be sentenced. This is so even where the offenders are foreign citizens. See n14 Malcolm Shaw, p.653. See also Holmes v. Bangladesh Binani Corporation [1989]1AC1112, 1137; 87ILR, pp.365, 380–1, per Lord GrifÞths and Lord Browne-Wilkinson in exparte Pinochet (No.3) [2000] 1 AC 147, 188; 119 ILR, p. 139.     

[xxxviii] Kingdom of Spain v Augusto Pinochet Ugarte 119 ILR 253; R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No 1) United Kingdom House of Lords (25 November 1998) 51; R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) United Kingdom House of Lords (25 November 1998) 112; R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) United Kingdom House of Lords (25 November 1998) 137. See also R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p the Kingdom of Belgium England High Court QueenÕs Bench Division (15 February 2000) 119 ILR 261; Al-Adsani  v United Kingdom (ECHR) Reports 2001-XI 79.    

[xxxix] On issues of immunity for Heads of State, see the statement of Lord Browne-Wilkinson in R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) United Kingdom House of Lords (25 November 1998) 137, para. 205. The jus cogens nature of the international crime of torture justifies states in taking universal jurisdiction over torture wherever committed. International law provides that offences jus cogens may be punished by any State because the offenders are common enemies of all mankind and all nations have an equal interest in their apprehension and prosecution: Demjanjuk v Petrovsky (1985) 603 F. Supp. 1468; 776 F. 2d. 571. 

[xl] Pursuant to the 1972 European Convention on Extradition to which Spain and the UK are contracting parties, Spain requested extradition of the former dictator and President of Chile, Augusto Pinochet from the UK. The Convention takes its effect from the Extradition Act 1989 (UK), see sections 1 and 2.

[xli] See R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) United Kingdom House of Lords (25 November 1998) 137. Owing to the fact that the UK, Spain and Chile had ratified the 1984 Convention Against Torture by 8 December 1988 therefore immunity could not be granted in international law for offences of torture or conspiracy to torture after this date thus extradition could proceed.

[xlii] International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED), 20 December, 2006.

 

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