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Counterinsurgency and Human Security: A Critical Analysis of the
US Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq, 2001-2014 |
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Aamer Raza* |
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Abstract In this article I
take up the counterinsurgency policy and practice of the US armed forces in
Afghanistan and Iraq. By focusing on the Counterinsurgency Manual 2006, I
highlight how the US counterinsurgency policy did not fully incorporate the
concept of human security. Accordingly, the counterinsurgency operations that
were carried out in the wake of the War on Terrorism failed to ensure human
security to the vulnerable segments of the populations in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Key words: Afghanistan,
Counterinsurgency, Human Security, Iraq, War on Terrorism. |
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Introduction |
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The intervening soldiers are positioned as protecting the
vulnerable, innocent civilians, who are feminized, from the hypermasculine
ÔevilÕ insurgents amongst them. Through being feminized, the locals are
portrayed as weak, vulnerable, passive and are thus disempowered, not then
included as partners in creating their own security. |
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--Duncanson and Cornish[1] |
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The increasing incidence of terrorism around the world during
the later years of President Barak Obama highlighted the limited success of
the US-led global war on terrorism. By 2014, not only did the incidence of
terrorism increase, there was also an apparent surge in the strength and
numbers of the terrorist groups. In 2013, a Rand Corporation report estimated
that since 2010 there had been a 58 percent increase in the number of
terrorist organizations, a doubling of the number of jihadist fighters and
tripling of attacks by these terrorist groups.[2]
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The
security situation for the vulnerable groups in the regions under US
counterinsurgency operations has particularly exacerbated. In 2013, violence
against women in Afghanistan touched record levels.[3]
The Yazidi minority in Iraq was practically faced with genocide.[4]
Iraqi Christians had to choose between their faith and their lives. The
number of Christians in Iraq had plummeted from 1.3 million at beginning of
counterinsurgency and had fallen to a reported 250,000.[5] |
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The
trends towards increased traditional and human security threats for the
populations the US set out to protect undoubtedly expose the limitations of
the military based counterterrorism strategy. This paper uses the guiding
documents for the US counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and
juxtaposes it with empirical examples to argue that despite their claims to
the contrary, the US policymakers and field operation commanders devised and
implemented counterinsurgency operations primarily from a strategic advantage
perspective rather than with a view to promote human security. The paper
advocates a more culturally sensitive and people-centered approach to
counterterrorism. This paper argues that if counterinsurgency policy is
informed of local practices of peacebuilding and if it includes the hitherto
marginalized groups then it will have a greater likelihood of success. |
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The
paper has three sections: First section analyzes the Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency published by the US
Department of Army in 2006. The document claims to represent an important
shift from looking at counterterrorism as high impact combat to looking at
ways that better address the underlying causes of violence. The second part
of the paper deals with the current practices of counterterrorism adopted by
the US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq to determine the extent to which the
practices outlined in the document are effectively combining the
counterterrorism goals with objectives to promote human security. In this
section, I evaluate the US counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq through
its impact on Afghan women and Iraqi Christian. The third and final section
will attempt to establish the manner and extent to which the people-centered
human security approach can add to the counterterrorism discourse. |
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Counterinsurgency and Human Security: A
Critical Analysis of the Counterinsurgency Manual 2006 |
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The counterinsurgency manual published in 2006 claims to
represent a major departure from the earlier manuals of field operations.
Applicable to both the US Army and Marine Corps, the document contained
instructions for the US forces in dealing with insurgents. The key idea
behind the document is to make counterinsurgency efforts more aware of the
local politics and culture. The manual recognizes the changing nature of
insurgencies in the context of globalization, technological advances
especially advances in the information technology and the declared religious
nature of insurgent groups. It is worth pointing out that this was the first
time in 20 years that the document was revised and published.[6] |
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For
the purpose of this paper, I focus on those chapters of the Manual that
relate with the definition of insurgency, counterinsurgency and the culture
and environment of counterinsurgencies. The purpose is to determine the
manner in which the document takes up the issues of security and insecurity,
particularly to analyze if it deals with aspects of human security. |
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The
document defines insurgency as Òthe organized use of subversion and violence
to seize, nullify or challenge political control of a region.Ó It is a form
of irregular militant struggle for control and influence, usually waged from
a position of weakness. It can start before, during or after the conventional
conflict. More importantly for us, the manual defines counterinsurgency as a
set of Òcivilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and
contain insurgency and address its root causes.Ó[7]
It is an important recognition by the document that civilian efforts have to
be an essential part of counterinsurgency efforts. It also recognizes the
importance of addressing the root causes. It obviously raises optimism
regarding the inclusion of the concept of human security into this definition
of counterinsurgency. |
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The
most important recognition in the introduction of the manual is the role
assigned to the host society. The document admits that the host society Òmust
eventually provide a solution that is culturally acceptable to its society
and meets the US policy goalsÓ (page: 1-2). Interestingly, the document
ignores the possibility that some local solutions might be at odds with the
purported US policy goals, and does not state what is to be prioritized if
such a situation arises. |
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In
outlining the US response to insurgency, the document again refers to
securing the civilian population as one of the foremost objectives of the
operations. For example, in the introductory chapter, the document mentions
that the host nation should determine the criteria for victory in an
insurgency based on local cultural expectations. The US counterinsurgents
should avoid judging local solutions based on their own cultural perceptions. |
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Chapter
1 also brings forward the important issue of local resilience. It involves
enabling the local populations to counter future situations like insurgencies
themselves without the need for international interventions. It suggests that
for long-term resolution of the conflict, the host government and political
institutions have to gain legitimacy within the local populations as the
insurgents try to undermine governmentÕs legitimacy. |
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The
report raises the interesting issue of coercion and consent in dealing with
populations during counterinsurgency operations. It suggests that coercion in
some form is always used. However, if governmentÕs use of coercion is
justified under local norms and traditions, it will not impact governmentÕs
legitimacy (pages 1-8). The document evades the question of vulnerable and silenced
groups. It fails to recognize cases where certain minorities or marginalized
groups are persecuted by the state in the name of security through coercion.
Such coercion may be accepted by the majority or the dominant groups within a
society and therefore may not create what the manual calls a legitimacy
crisis. However, such a situation which is surprisingly common around the
world will result in continued persecution of the marginalized groups. It is
the kind of issue that better human security approaches would enable us to
avoid. It is such persecution that makes vulnerable groups see the insurgents
as their protectors and the state and foreign counterinsurgents lose their
legitimacy. |
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Chapter
3 of the manual deals specifically with the local cultures as operational
environment. The report makes the important admission that the insurgents
have massive advantage over foreign insurgents in understanding the local
cultures and grievances. It admonishes the US soldiers against judging
behaviors and reactions based on their own perceptions. Once more, the manual
evades the common dilemma referred to by Amartya Sen that in certain
contexts, the predominant groups use cultural relativism to undermine the
efforts to restructure in favor of suppressed groups.[8]
For instance, Òemancipating womenÓ was one of the driving motives for
intervention in Afghanistan. However, numerous studies suggest that Afghan
attitude toward womenÕs participation in public life was often closer to the
one of the Taliban than those promoted by the United States.[9] |
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Chapter
3 also makes the important argument of the changing perception of security in
the minds of local populations during war. It says that values and traditions
of a society are the product of evolution over hundreds of years. It then
insinuates that the marginalization of women in these Middle Eastern
societies is a reasonable response to changes brought about by the conflict
(pages 2-3). Furthermore, it goes on to suggest that the identification of
individuals who are seen as community leaders locally is important to the
success of counterinsurgency. Such an approach can be counterproductive for
securitizing groups that are marginalized in the social structure and the
conflict presents them with an opportunity to realign the social order to
their advantage. By preserving the social order through cooptation of the
community leaders would undermine groups such as Afghan women that research
has exhibited do benefit from conflicts due to increased roles and
responsibilities.[10] |
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The
manual further advises operation commanders to integrate Human Terrain Teams
into counterinsurgency policy planning. Consisting of social scientists and
researchers, Human Terrain Team helps commanders better understand the local
environment (Page: 3-4). The encouraging aspect of the human terrain system
is that, at least theoretically, it provides for inclusion of the vulnerable
groups. For example, the document says that each team in Afghanistan is
supposed to have an Afghan woman, so as to make it possible to reach out to
the women. However, research has indicated increased level of security
threats to individuals working with the human terrain teams resulting in some
cases of fatalities.[11]
It questions the strategy as it focuses excessively on gathering intelligence
even when it might jeopardize the security of human subjects involved. |
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Chapter 4 raises the important issue of understanding the
identities in the local contexts. It cautions the commanding officers against
becoming part of the local power struggles. It recommends that in certain
situations there might be populations that are underrepresented in the state
apparatuses and therefore might provide support base and recruiting ground
for insurgents. In order to cope with the insurgency in the long-term, it is
essential to eliminate such underrepresentation. |
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The manual admonishes US armed forces personnel engaged in
counterinsurgency in other parts of the world about issues arising from
cultural relativism. It points to the changing trends in global politics and
the flux in the nature of counterinsurgencies. The manual is not the only
effort to integrate broader human and economic security goals into the US
counterinsurgency strategy. The subsequent sections refer to other actions
and pronouncements to this effect. Our goal in this article is to understand
if this slight shift in approach towards more human-centered
counterinsurgency has any bearing on situation on the ground. |
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Human Security of the Vulnerable: Case
Studies of Women in Afghanistan and Christians in Iraq |
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My assumption about the US approach to counterinsurgency is that
it is contrary to the claims made in the Counterinsurgency Manual. In
practice commanders and strategists on ground prioritize the traditional
military security concerns over the human security. In this section I look at
two case studies—women in Afghanistan and Chritians in Iraq who have
often been neglected in counter-insurgency operations in the past. Through
these case studies I highlight how the current counter-insurgency also
neglects them and therefore fails in concerns about human security. |
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a) Afghan Women: |
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We know well that the Taliban were notorious were their
suppression of women.[12]
They did not allow women to go outside of their houses for any purpose whether
it was education or health care or shopping.[13]
The Taliban had imposed a hard-line Islamic policy which envisioned complete
control of women and taking them out of the public sphere. With such a policy
the overall conditions of life for women of Afghanistan began to deteriorate.
On the other hand, it is also worth mentioning the Taliban and other
warlords, and alliances, targeted women of their adversaries and committed
grave acts of violence against them. |
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It
was in this background of violence and precarious conditions for women in
Afghanistan that the US began its counter-insurgency program. Let me point
out that in launching the War on Terror in Afghanistan, one of the
justifications put forward by President George W. Bush was that the struggle
was about restoring the rights and dignity of Afghan women.[14]
The White House consistently referred to the plight of Afghan women in the
Taliban controlled Afghanistan and the need for their liberation from
violence and depression that they were facing. Thus the legitimization of war
on the grounds of protecting women raised hopes that special measures would
be taken during the war and later though the counterinsurgency operations. |
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However,
some critical feminist writers pointed out that in practice Afghan women were
being treated as mere victims rather than active agents of change in their
societies. They further pointed out that cooptation of women issues into
political projects so as to draw moral foundation on the claims of serving
women but in fact compromised them to Òmore important matters of national
interest.Ó[15]
Others pointed out that there was lack of interest in the dismal conditions
of Afghan women during the Taliban rule. And now after the 9/11 attacks there
is sudden growth of interest, which shows the coincidental and opportunistic
face of the US counterinsurgency policy.[16] |
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After
the removal of the Taliban rule when the US armed forces designed and
implemented its counter insurgency policy, they gave special attention to the
Afghan women. Accordingly they set up separate teams called the Female
Engagement Teams (FETs). The FETs were composed of women soldiers from Army
and the Marines. The rationale behind setting up FETs ranged from winning
hearts and minds of Afghan Women to gathering intelligence through them. The
FETs were to perform various functions including humanitarian assistance,
facilitating women and children access to health care and, interestingly, to
Òmediate between American and Afghan Male egos.Ó[17]
Despite the proclaimed important role assigned to the FETs, they had little
actual engagement with Afghan women. One of the reasons for this is that they
are always escorted by their fellow male soldiers like Afghan women are
escorted by their men and all this escorting practice diminishes the
possibility of women on the two side.[18] |
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Although
a constructive and commendable step, the FETs could not succeed in their
envisioned role. The failure of FETs thus points to the failure of ensuring
security of Afghan women. It also points out to the failure of the larger
claim of their liberation in post Taliban era. Generally this failure was attributed to the thinking and
training of the battlefield commanders who saw little strategic utility in
engaging with local women, or women to women engagement, and that reaching
out to Afghan women might offend Afghan men.[19]
Other reasons of the failure include the precedence that the strategic
advantage has over issues of human security in the practice of
counterinsurgency. Whereas it is understandable that operational commanders
would try to maximize output from engagement with local populations, a
hardcore utilitarian approach betrays the earlier commitment regarding the
protection of vulnerable local populations, particularly Afghan women. |
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There
is also certain lack of motivation among commanders to challenge the status
quo and restructure gender relations in Afghanistan due to the fear of
backlash from the more conservative segments of the local population. Again
it suggests that the aim of regime change has been prioritized over ensuring
human security. More properly, such an approach might even perpetuate the
state in which Afghan women had been living under the Taliban. |
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Despite
increased representation Afghan women currently enjoy in the public spaces, the
levels of insecurity remain high. Although women have been given
representation to sit in the Afghan Parliament, and schools for girls have
been reopened, maternal mortality rates of 650 per 100,000 live births and a
high suicide rate among women tell a different story. Not only has women
liberation been excluded as an object from the counterinsurgency campaign,
various writers argue that Afghan women have been made more insecure as a
result. Displacement, violent death as collateral damage from both sides of
the conflict and use as human shield by the Taliban insurgents have left
Afghan women with little hope for immediate improvement in their security.[20]
Unfortunately, the focus on traditional security has also resulted in a shift
of focus from domestic violence against women.[21] |
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It
is worth mentioning that the counter insurgency policy generated a major
problem as the US made an alliance with the Northern Alliance. The latter
were no good in their reputation about treating women and they continued to
suppress rights of women. Reports suggest that in parts of rural Afghanistan
punishment for ÔdisobedienceÕ during the Taliban period was flogging, now it
is rape.[22]
Reports suggest that women still remain confined to their homes. The
incidence of rape by armed factions still remains extremely high.[23] |
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Despite
all the tall claims of providing security to women of Afghanistan, the US
counter-insurgency practice subordinated it to concerns of controlling the
territory against the Taliban. Secondly, in order to defeat the Taliban and
al Qaeda, the United States thought that it needed support of local warlords,
even though they were notorious for the crimes against women. The US could
have made them to write agreements relating to human security and especially
women security before making alliance with them. But no such agreements were
done. Therefore, the security of women grew weak with the passage of time.
The US failed to condition its support to them on their treating of women. |
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b) Iraqi Christians: |
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In 2003 the US Armed Forces intervened in Iraq and removed
Saddam HussainÕs government. After the removal of Saddam HusaainÕs
government, his political faction, the BaÕath Party, started insurgency. It
had not yet been quelled that the Shia insurgency under the leadership of
Muqtada us Sadr started. The US had to deal it with a different approach.
Meanwhile al-Qaeda by creating linkage with local tribes, under the
leadership of Abou Musab al Zarqawi took hold in the border regions of the
country. The US had to suffer substantial damage and had to make compromises
with the tribes on Iraqi Syrian border in dealing with the al Qaeda as well.
Meanwhile, the predominantly Shia, Maliki government in Baghdad failed to
include Sunnis in the political power structure. The long series of events
involving misunderstanding of the Iraqi culture, tribal and sectarian divides
led to the rise of the most hardline extremist group in the region in the
form of the ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria).[24] |
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Just
like the condition of women in Afghanistan, the condition of Christians in
Iraq went from bad to worse during the counterinsurgency phase. Christians
faced violence at the hand of almost all the parties involved in the
conflict. One of the indicators of violence and the sense of victimization
and insecurity among Christians was that their population dropped from more
than a million at the start of the war to about 450,000-250,000 by 2013.[25] |
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It
is worth mentioning that Christians were not persecuted in Iraq under Saddam
Hussain. The last deputy prime minister in his government, Tariq Aziz, was a
Christian.[26]
Shias and Kurds were seen as the primary threats to his government and,
therefore, the harshest treatment was usually reserved for them. In the
post-Saddam Iraq, Shias and Kurds started to play a more prominent role as
they had greater numbers and greater importance for the US strategic goals in
Iraq. However, Christians had to bear the brunt of lawlessness in the
country. |
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On
the one hand, the US despite its resolve mentioned in the Manual, which we
analyzed earlier, did little to ensure security of the Iraqi Christians. On
the other hand, the insurgents also projected them to have connections the US
because of their same Christian faith.[27]
On August 1, 2004, a series of car bombings took place outside five churches
in Baghdad and Mosul. The perpetrators later declared that the act had been
undertaken because they saw Christians to be helping the US and its allied
forces in Iraq.[28] |
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The situation for Iraqi Christians deteriorated even further
after the rise of the ISIS. The group is particularly brutal on religious,
sectarian and ethnic minorities. More than 100,000 Christians fled from areas
under control of the ISIS to Kurdistan, which wa still controlled by Kurd
Peshmerga forces, and remained unsure about ever returning back to their
homes.[29]
On September 10, 2014 President Barak H. Obama made a promise to Christians
of Iraq that he would make sure the ISIS would not drive the out of their
historical homelands.[30] |
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The
status of Iraqi Christians is particularly tricky: one cannot blame the US
policy directly for their increased level of insecurity. Insurgent groups see
them as a soft target as infidels and a population that can be linked with
the US. However, my primary critique of the US approach to counterinsurgency
remains the same: as long as the priorities of the US or any other
counterinsurgency operations revolve around regime change and defeating the
insurgents without looking at the impacts that such an approach would have on
vulnerable populations, human security objectives will remain compromised. |
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A Critical Appraisal of Human Security
Approach to Counterinsurgency |
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Despite the rise of concepts such as humanitarian intervention,
human security, and the responsibility to protect,[31]
the US counterinsurgency approach does not seem to have benefited from them.
SaddamÕs regime in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan had been violating
human security of their vulnerable populations with impunity. There was
hardly any significant reaction from the international community. It is only
when they posed traditional security threats – Saddam in the form of
alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Taliban by harboring Usama bin
Laden – that the international community felt the need to (or made
pretext of) protecting the vulnerable. In doing so, they jeopardized even
further the security of the vulnerable communities. |
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Due
to their asymmetrical organization and opportunistic vision, insurgents
create human security issues for the vulnerable population. Most
counterinsurgency campaigns involve use of force. As soldiers are trained and
equipped to fight conventional wars, the terrain that involves vulnerable
populations makes it difficult for them to operate.[32]
In this way, both insurgencies and counterinsurgencies tend to create human
security issues. |
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My
approach to counterinsurgency is based on problem solving and conflict
resolution through human security lens. The approach does not just view local
vulnerable populations as subjects to be saved, but also they should be the
primary focus of counterinsurgency operations. On the other hand the US
counterinsurgency policy and practice that we discussed in the two case
studies treat these local vulnerable populations as mere passive victims in the
conflict between insurgents and counterinsurgents. It should rather adopt the
human security approach and focus on securitizing the vulnerable populations.
In this way it can also win minds and hearts of the people. |
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I
argue for the focus on vulnerable population because it provides for
recruiting ground for insurgents. As it is rightly recognized by the Manual
that we discussed in the first part of our discussion insurgents normally
have an edge at understanding and instrumentalizing the local grievances and
desires. They also have better chances to shift the blame for miseries of the
people on the foreign counterinsurgents as the ÔotherÕ. This advantage makes
it easy for them to recruit more soldiers and fighters in their ranks. To
cope with these strengths of insurgents a counterinsurgency policy cannot be
oblivious to local cultures and traditions, the grievances of the people and
the power structures. It is for this reason that counterinsurgency cannot be
indiscriminate in their use of force. |
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On
many occasions, indiscriminate use of force helps on eliminating members of
the insurgent groups, but it also results in boosting the ranks of
insurgents. As more civilians die, there grows resentment against foreign
counterinsurgents. It makes insurgentsÕ claims seem more justified and their
battle worth fighting. Therefore, ensuring human security needs to be the
first priority of a counterinsurgency force. This approach could bring more
legitimacy to counterinsurgency and leave insurgents without much to build
their claims on. |
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As
mentioned earlier, the foreign counterinsurgents usually fall into the trap
of supporting one powerful group at the expense of another. It only
facilitates the ascendance to power of a group that may not be diametrically
different from the insurgents, but is preferred due to the ease of cooption
and its military power. It creates resentment among the local populations
that might look at both set of groups in the same light. Turning a blind eye
to the Sunni boycott of elections and restoring Shia elite to power in Iraq
after the downfall of Saddam was one such mistake.[33] |
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On
the other hand, the examples of Afghan women and Iraqi Christians demonstrate
the grievous situation counter-insurgencies bring upon vulnerable and
marginalized populations. These populations are seen as relatively important
for the counterinsurgents in achieving their immediate goals, and are
therefore, not prioritized over the issues of hardcore security. However, it
is these policy priorities on the part of the counterinsurgents that create
their image as an ÒEmpireÓ, and their goals as self-serving.[34]
But we need to keep on mind that in the long run insurgents and
counterinsurgents try to draw their legitimacy from the morality of their
means and goals.[35] |
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Conclusion: |
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As conventional wars between states become less frequent, and as
armed engagements conflicts become more asymmetrical, the need to study the
impact of such conflicts on human security is of paramount importance. In
traditional interstate warfare, the possibility of victimhood was less
dependent on peopleÕs gender, racial or religious identities as the national
identities would be viewed as the primary identity of combatants and civilian
populations. In the more localized insurgencies, these identities determine
the amount of security threat an individual faces. |
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Conflicts
at these levels seriously threaten the social fabric and weaken political
legitimacy for all actors. In such an environment in which various parties
are contesting for legitimacy, the protection of vulnerable groups is not
seen as anyoneÕs responsibility in particular. Further, the competing forces
prioritize defeating one another over securing the populations. |
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In
this line of thought, I think the US counterinsurgency policy should
prioritize its human security goals. As we discussed above, such an approach
will not only increase human security but will also bring greater legitimacy
to the counterinsurgency among the local populations. Moreover, the
Counterinsurgency Manual and the rhetoric about promoting human security need
greater operationalizing to be effective. The most important dimension of
promoting human security is to avoid ÔsubstitutionismÕ that allows certain
groups to claim representation towards the rest.[36]
In many cases, counterinsurgency operations bring individuals to power
without regard to their record and beliefs about issues of security to the
vulnerable groups. In such a situation, even if the insurgency is defeated,
it will bring little comfort to the populations in whose name the
counterinsurgency was started in the first place. |
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Notes |
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